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PENSION REFORMS IN EMERGING EUROPE: THE UNCERTAIN ROAD 
AHEAD1
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
1.      Comprehensive pension reforms have been a cornerstone of fiscal policies in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In response to population aging pressures, a number 
of Emerging European economies reformed their pension systems in the late 1990s and early 
2000s by adopting multi-pillar pension frameworks. Pension reforms were anticipated to 
improve long-run fiscal sustainability and lead to better macroeconomic outcomes, including 
higher national saving rates and increased labor participation. An important part of the 
reforms was the introduction of a private, in most cases mandatory, pre-funded, defined-
contribution second pillar pension system. This private component, in conjunction with the 
public first pillar, was expected to help diversify risks, supplement old-age income for 
pensioners that was being tightened under the public pension schemes, and help with the 
development of capital markets.  
2.      Nevertheless, since the onset of the global crisis in late 2008, several countries 
have been backtracking on the funding of their private pension systems to help lower 
their fiscal deficits. The global downturn led to a significant deterioration in countries’ 
public finances, with the average deficit of the EU10 rising from about 1 to an estimated 6 
percent of GDP between 2007 and 2010. In an effort to helping to bridge the shortfall in their 
fiscal revenues, six CEE countries decided to reduce pre-funding of pensions by diverting 
pension contributions from their private to the public pension systems. Some countries did so 
on a temporary basis, while experiencing deep recessions and as a complement to significant 
fiscal consolidation. Others, however, have sought to permanently reduce and even eliminate 
contributions to the private pension system well into the recovery, and in one case, in 
conjunction with other expansionary fiscal measures.  
 
                                                 
1 By DeliaVelculescu, IMF, dvelculescu@imf.org. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and 
should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management. 
Source: IMF Fall 2010 WEO.
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3.      These actions reflect the individual countries’ recognition of the large fiscal costs 
associated with pre-funding of future pension liabilities. The pension reforms kept overall 
individual pension contribution rates the same (or even lowered them), while redirecting a 
part of the contributions to the pillar II, where they accumulated in individual accounts 
managed by the private pension funds. In the meantime, the public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
pillar I systems were faced with lower contribution rates but unchanged benefit payments for 
current pensioners (even as some countries also introduced parametric reforms aimed at 
lowering benefits under the first pillar over the long run). In the absence of additional fiscal 
consolidation measures, governments issued debt to cover the contribution-benefit gap in the 
pillar I system, leading to higher government deficits and explicit public debt. Moreover, 
pension assets accumulated in the private pension funds could not be counted as part of the 
government accounts.  
4.      Pre-funding costs make it more difficult for pension reformers to comply with 
the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) rules. With fiscal deficits already swollen as a 
result of the global crisis, countries that have pre-funded their future pension liabilities and 
hence bear an additional fiscal cost will find it harder to comply with the Maastricht limits of 
3 percent of GDP for deficits and 60 percent of GDP for public debt. This is in contrast with 
countries that have not reformed their pension systems, including by pre-funding pension 
liabilities, whose deficit and explicit debt may be currently low, but projected to rise only 
later due to large implicit pension liabilities. By maintaining uniform debt and deficit limits 
under the SGP, in effect, some countries are being penalized for pre-funding pension 
liabilities and may even be subject to financial sanctions under “strengthened” SGP rules 
once they become members of the euro-area.  
5.      This paper takes stock of the pension reforms introduced by CEE countries with 
focus on the private second pillars, discusses their fiscal cost implications, and outlines 
some forward-looking policy options. Section II presents a retrospective on the pension 
reforms in the CEE, including the motivation for the multi-pillar, partially pre-funded 
approach undertaken in the region and a preliminary assessment of their benefits to date. 
Section III analyzes the fiscal cost implications of pre-funding pensions via private second 
pillar systems, with focus on Poland as a case study. Section IV highlights the tensions with 
the SGP rules, summarizes the recent reform reversals, and discusses policy options both for 
individual countries and at the EU level. Section V presents the main conclusions of the 
paper.    
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Country Public debt Pension Spending Implicit Pension
Slovenia 25 11 298
Poland 43 12 261
Romania 18 6 256
Slovak
(in percent of GDP)
 Debt 
ia 31 8 210
Hungary 59 9 203
Croatia 33 11 201
Estonia 7 9 189
Lithuania 28 7 15
Source: Holzmann, Palacios, and Zviniene (2004)
Romania 
Lithuania 
Slovak Rep. 
Poland 
Old-Age Dependency Ratio
(In percent of working age population)
II.   A RETROSPECTIVE ON EASTERN EUROPE’S PENSION REFORMS 
6.      In the late 1990s, it became widely recognized that pension systems in CEE 
countries were unsustainable.2 First, these countries expected significant population ag
caused by falls in fertility rates, increases in life expectancy, and the post-war demographic 
boom. The demographic dependency ratio (pensioners to working 
population) of the EU10 was around 17 percent in 1990, 
relative to a projected 63 percent by 2060, compared to 
an average projected increase in dependency ratios of 
30 percentage points for the Euro Area during this 
period. Second, these countries inherited PAYG 
pension systems from so
0 20 40 60
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Latvia 
2060
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Source: Eurostat.
groups. Third, a number of countries had generous early 
retirement provisions, lax legislation on disability 
eligibility, and generous pensions and pension 
indexation. At the same time, they were experiencing 
a decline in employment following the fall of socialist 
regimes, which led to rising system dependency ratios 
(number of persons receiving social insurance divided 
by number of contributors) that exceeded demographic 
dependency ratios (in Poland, this excess was close to 
40 percent in 1995). As a result of these factors, public 
pension systems were unsustainable, with the s
ing 
cialist times that were 
especially susceptible to political pressures and influence 
ize of implicit pension debt estimated at over 
200 percent of GDP in many of the CEE countries (Table 1).3  
 
                                              
    
Table 1: Implicit Pension Debt in the CEE, 2000 
 
 
 
 
   
for example, Fox and Palmer (2000) and Muhler (2008). 
plicit pension debt is defined as accrued obligations to current pensioners and contributors in the system (so 
lled “closed-group” pension liabilities), accounting for expected contributions, under current policies. 
ligations to new entrants into the labor force are not included (see Holzmann et. al, 2004). 
2 See, 
3 Im
ca
Ob
 
4 
 
 
7.      In re opting 
multi-pillar systems.4 These systems are comprised of a pillar I pay-as-you-go public 
ges, while participation has varied 
) to 95 percent in Poland.  
r Reform in the CEE 
2004 2005 2008
 PAYG DB, PAYG Pension 
points
Pension points
Prefunded Prefunded Prefunded Prefunded
Mandatory up 
 18, 
l for 
ers
Optional Mandatory 
for new 
entrants
Mandatory up 
to age 35, 
optional ages 
35-44 
5( incl. 
ployer's 
6 9 employers' 
contribution
2, planned to 
increase to 6
52 72 N/A
6 4.0 1.7 N/A
sponse, several CEE countries reformed their pension systems, ad
defined-benefit pillar I system (or, in a few countries, a notional defined contribution 
system), and a private, mostly mandatory, defined contribution, fully-funded pillar II system 
(Table 2). In some countries, a voluntary (though typically small) pillar III private system 
was also established and complemented with tax incentives. Contri
pension pillar have generally been up to 10 percent of wa
between 50 percent of total persons employed (Lithuania
Table 2: Pension Systems afte
Hungary Poland Latvia Bulgar
Pension reform date 1998 1999 2001 2000 2002
Public pillar I
DB, PAYG NDC, PAYG NDC, PAYG Pension points DB,
Private pillar II 
Prefunded Prefunded Prefunded Prefunded
Mandatory/optional Mandatory 
for new 
entrants
Mandatory up 
to age 29, 
optional ages 
30-49 
Mandatory up 
to age 29, 
optional ages 
30-49 
Mandatory up 
to age 40 to age
optiona
oth
Individual 
Contribution Rate 
8 7.3 10 5 (incl. 
employer's 
6.
em
Contributors as 
share of employed 
69 95 82 73 (as of 2006) 80
Assets in percent of 
GDP, end-2006
6.3 11.1 3.9 1.9 3.
Source: Muller (2008).
bution rates in the private 
ia Estonia Lithuania Slovakia Romania
 
ainability, provide 
risk diversification, pecifically: 
• While the introduction of private pension systems was not expected to improve fiscal 
sustainability itself, it was thought to help to facilitate reforms in the first pillar aimed 
at reducing the generosity of pensions in light of expected population aging, which, in 
turn, would lead to a an improvement in long-run fiscal positions.  
• Private management of pillar II was expected to lead to better risk diversification, by 
linking benefits not only to the return on labor (as under pillar I), but also on capital 
(these returns have been shown to be imperfectly correlated—see Bohn, 1998), as 
well as through investments abroad. This was also expected to lead to an increase in 
returns (as the return on capital is generally higher than that on labor over the long 
run), which would provide additional income support in old age, especially as 
benefits under the pillar I system were already tightened or expected to decline. On 
the downside, administrative costs and fees associated with private management of 
pension funds was expected to offset part of the extra gains due to diversification.    
• Private management of pillar II was intended to avoid political manipulation that 
n assets. It was also expected to 
8.      The reforms were expected to improve long-run fiscal sust
 and lead to additional macroeconomic benefits. S
could arise with public management of pensio
                                                 
4 Also see James (1998), Cangiano et. al. (1998).  
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mitigate the political risk associated with frequent legislation changes regarding 
contribution and benefit rates, as politicians tended to promise short-run generous 
benefits while passing the costs to future generations. 
• Establishment of actual individual saving accounts under pillar II increased 
transparency by allowing individuals to see the value of their accumulated 
contributions at any point in time and make judgments as to its adequacy.  It also 
provided a sense of “ownership” (which may have been particularly important in 
post-socialist CEE countries) compared to only a promise of future benefits under the 
pillar I system. 
• The defined-contribution characteristic of Pillar II (and in a few cased reformed pillar 
I systems) aimed to better link contributions to benefits, which was expected to lower 
evasion from the formal sector and remove incentives for early retirement, with 
positive effects on labor supply, labor earnings, and the saving rate (see Lindbeck and 
Persson, 2002). 
 Pre-funding of future liabilities in pillar II was thought to lead to higher private and 
national saving (and hence reduce reliance on foreign capital flows), provided that 
liquidity constrained individuals did not offset such saving, and the transition toward 
the new system were not fully financed by debt issuance.   
s.  
ase of 
t worth 
indicators, which reflect the total current and projected future net liabilities of the public 
sector under unchanged policies (text figure).5 These indicators capture three main elements: 
a measure of current financial net worth, which quantifies the effects of past policies on 
countries’ current fiscal positions; a component reflecting medium-term changes in the 
primary balance, given current policies; and a measure of long-run changes in primary 
balances, which takes into account the effects of population aging under current pension 
frameworks. CEE countries, among others, benefitted from relatively lower aging costs due 
to pension reforms, which translate into a relatively low long-run component in the overall 
measures of intertemporal net worth (Figure 1). This, however, is mainly attributable to 
measures that were taken to lower benefits under the pillar I system, with the introduction of 
the private pillar II system being beneficial only to the extent that it had facilitated such 
changes.      
                                                
•
• Pillar II systems were also expected to help with the development of capital market
• The Pillar I system was maintained to preserve a redistributive element (in the c
defined-benefit systems) and protect individuals against the risk of return inherent in 
private systems (see Heller, 1998).   
9.      Ex post, reforms—mainly relating to the public first pillar—have helped to 
improve CEE countries’ long-run sustainability positions. The reforming countries fare 
better relative to peers on long-run sustainability measures, such as intertemporal ne
 
5 See Velculescu (2010). The figures presented are based on IMF macroeconomic data as of April 2010, and 
baseline long-term aging data(including pensions, health, etc.) from the EC’s 2009 Sustainability Report, and do 
not include measures taken since then.  Sustainability gaps represent “open group” liabilities, in that they take 
t and future generations.  into account aging-related liabilities of both curren
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EU27 Intertemporal Net Worth Derived from the Balance Sheet Approach 
(In percent of GDP)
Source: Velculescu (2010), and IMF staf f  estimates. Data f rom Spring 2010 IMF WEO.
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10.      
countr lly experience them. Labor force participation rates appear to have 
prov
causali  
Republ
a still r ades to materialize), the 
ative
sets 
CEE, th
may ha nsion funds on financial markets, which may 
e cent 
As to the expected benefits of introducing private second pillar systems, the CEE 
ies have yet to fu
im ed in most countries (except for Poland and Lithuania) since the introduction of 
private defined-contribution pension systems, though it is difficult to establish direct 
ty. At the same time, saving rates in most countries did not increase, except for Slovak
ic and Poland, with a large decline observed in Hungary. These mixed results reflects 
ecent reform track record (with benefits expected to take dec
rel ly limited size of the pillar II (which limits incentives for greater labor force 
participation), and countries’ choice to finance resulting gaps by debt issuance (which largely 
off the rise in private savings associated with private pre-funding). Furthermore, in the 
e rapid expansion of the banking sector concurrently with the private pension sector 
ve partially obscured the effects of pe
becom  clearer looking forward, as bank activity is expected to moderate. Still, a more re
paper (Hryckiewicz, 2009) finds some supporting evidence for positive effects of pension 
reform in CEE countries on stock market capitalization and activity.  
‐3
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Source:  Eurostat and IMF Fall 2010 WEO.   
11.      Nevertheless, such benefits could be important, provided that other policies 
appropriately support the functioning of the private pension system. The international 
cross-country evidence on the macroeconomic benefits of private pensions is mixed (a World 
Bank study, 2006, concludes that such benefits “remain largely unrealized”). But this should 
not be interpreted as definite evidence against private pension systems, given the inherent 
limitations of such cross-country studies, which often rely on relatively short time series, 
include a wide variety of reform types and initial conditions, and are subject to econometric 
difficulties with separating the effects of pension reforms from other factors. Moreover, 
reform implementation, including design issues and supporting policies (such as fiscal 
policies, but also regulatory and supervisory frameworks), are key in influencing the effects 
of pension systems, though they are difficult to capture in such studies. In contrast, several 
case studies on Chile—which represents the longest reform implementation, also 
complemented by fiscal consolidation and an appropriate regulatory framework—document 
 
 accompanied by supportive 
fiscal and regulatory policies, pension reforms can have important long-run benefits.    
empirically significant and positive effects of the introduction of the private pension system
on growth through higher saving and effects on capital markets. Moreover, additional studies 
provide some support for the microeconomic benefits of private pension systems for capital 
market development (see Box 1). This evidence suggests that, if
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Box1: Private Pillar II Systems and Capital Market Development 
 
Private, fully-funded pillar II pension systems have been expected to improve the efficiency 
of saving and investment decisions, including through deepening capital markets. Several 
main outcomes have been identified in the theoretical literature (see Davis, 1998 and Iglesias, 
2007). While the cross-country empirical evidence on overall effects remains mixed, some 
studies  provide support in favor of specific outcomes:  
 
1. A larger size of the capital market: Funded pension systems may lead to an increase in 
personal savings, especially if there are liquidity constraints that do not allow individuals to 
borrow against future pensions (Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1997, Poterba et al 1996, 
World Bank, 1993). This has an impact on the volume of savings intermediated through 
capital markets—even in the absence of an increase in national saving—leading to higher 
trading and demand for long-term financial instruments (for empirical evidence, see 
Impavido and Musalem, 2000; Hryckiewicz, 2009). If not offset by larger fiscal deficits, 
national saving and investment could also rise, with beneficial effects on growth, as 
documented empirically for Chile (Holzmann, 1997, and Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003).    
2. Improvements in regulation and transparency of capital markets: Pension funds’ 
demand for financial instruments can help drive investor protection regulations. Moreover, 
the quality and timeliness of information available to investors is likely to improve as 
demand from pension funds rises and as requirements imposed by pension funds are higher; 
the creation of risk-rating systems also improves transparency (see empirical evidence 
provided in Walker and Lefort, 2002).   
3. Better corporate governance practices: Higher demand and more stringent requirements 
by pension funds may serve to improve regulations aimed at minimizing conflict on interest 
risk and strengthening rights of minority shareholders (see Blake and Orszag, 1998, Iglesias 
2000, del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999).  
4. Improvements in financial innovation: The significant size of investments by pension 
funds could lead to the development of institutions, such as custodians, clearing mechanisms, 
electronic trading platforms. Moreover, risk diversification and hedging requirements by 
pension funds could lead to the development of junior markets, corporate bonds, indexed 
instruments, and index futures (see Bodie, 1990).  
5. Lower cost of capital and security-price volatility: The higher risk tolerance and longer 
investment horizon of pension funds (relative to individual investors or banks) implies that, 
even if total savings do not increase, term and risk premia would fall, lowering the cost of 
capital (Walker and Lefort 2002).   
6. Higher quality of investment decisions, and increased financial integration: As private 
pension funds hold a greater proportion of longer-term assets, they can better pool and 
diversify risks across assets, have access to better information relative to individuals, and 
could diversify portfolios internationally, leading to greater financial market integration.   
 
Nevertheless, private pension funds may also have side effects, including disintermediation 
that could lead to more risk-taking by banks, short-term and herding behavior that may 
exacerbate volatility at times of high financial stress, and neglect of small firms in favor of 
investments in large companies. There are also important preconditions for pension reform—
uch as a strong regulatory framework, a sound banking sector, a strong insurance sector, and 
ound macroeconomic policies—which, together with flexibility of investment decisions, are 
crucial in reinforcing the pension funds’ beneficial effects on capital market development. 
s
s
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III.   FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRE-FUNDING FUTURE LIABILITIES: THE CASE OF POLAND  
12.      At the time of the implementation of private pension systems in the CEE, re
costs were expected to be significant but manageable. Lindeman et. al. (2000) estim
that in European and Central Asian reform countries, a second pillar financed by a 
contribution rate of 8 percent of gross wage would require resources equal to around 1-3 
percent of GDP during the initial years of reform, depending on workforce coverage. Given 
that amounts of this magnitude were unlikely to be fully covered with offsetting adju
in the PAYG pension system, some debt financing, additional fiscal consolidation, and 
recourse to privatization were considered to be required during the transition. Raising 
contribution rates was not advised, given the potentially negative consequences on labor 
markets. Still, expected benefits of reform were thought to outweigh the costs over the long
run, with projected improvements in the labor market thought to be key in helping to bridge 
the temporary gap resulting from pre-funding of future liabilities.  
form 
ated 
stments 
 
13.      Looking at the case of Poland, pre-funding of future liabilities has had a fiscal 
cost of 1-2 percent of GDP per year over the past decade. Information on actual and 
projected reform costs for individual countries in not readily available. Nevertheless, looking 
at Poland, which has one of the longest and most comprehensive reform records in the CEE, 
provides a useful benchmark. In Poland, the overall pension contribution rate remained 
unchanged at 19.5 percent of wages after the reform, of which 7.3 percent of wages was 
diverted to the private pillar II system. The gap arising from lower contributions available to 
finance an unchanged level of current benefits in the public pay-as-you-go system amounted 
to about 1.5-2 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2010. In 2009 and 2010, it accounted for 
about half of the yearly gap between social revenues and expenditures of the public pension 
system.  
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(percent of GDP)
Source: ZUS; MoF; and  IMF staff estimates.
14.      Financing the pre-funding of future liabilities by debt accumulation implied an
accrued total cost of about 15 percent of GDP at end-2010. Despite original intentions to 
use privatization receipts and other fiscal measures, as needed, the cost of pre-funding future 
liabilities in the private pillar II pension system was entirely financed through the issuance of 
public debt. Such debt was largely bought by the pension funds themselves. As result, the 
true cost of prefunding is comprised not only of the yearly loss in revenue discussed above, 
but also of the interest paid on the debt issued to finance it. Compounding these yearly costs 
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(at an avera sion debt 
accumulated as a resu
s expected to continue to add 
 
 
t 
s 
 
ents 
d, as 
ge interest rate on 2 and 5 year treasury bonds) implies that the total pen
lt of debt-financed prefunding amounted to about 15 percent of GDP at 
end-2010, or almost 1/3rd of Poland’ total public debt. At the same time, the assets 
accumulated in the private pension funds amounted to around 16 percent of GDP by end-
2010, suggesting that, on net, private saving has been roughly offset by public dis-saving.  
15.      Looking forward, debt-financed pre-funding i
about 1.5-2 percent of GDP per year to the deficit over the next two decades and about
60 percent of GDP to debt by 2060. Official projections by the state management agency of
the public pension system (ZUS) show that the pillar I system is expected to remain in defici
until 2060 (these projections do not include the recently proposed changes to the pension 
system). As explained earlier, part of this deficit is due to the loss of the contributions that 
now pre-fund future pensions under pillar II. Simulating a full elimination of pre-funding a
of 2011 results in a significant deficit reduction over the next two decades compared to no
change to the original system, as more contribution revenues come in while benefit paym
initially remain unchanged, though they eventually rise (Box 2).  This exercise illustrates that 
ot the costs of pre-funding can be significant and long lasting. Moreover, these costs add n
only to the deficit, but, to the extent that they are debt-financed, also to debt and interest 
payments. The total cost of debt-financed pre-funding for Poland projected to amount to 
about 60 percent of GDP during 2011-60 (a 1 percent interest-growth differential is assumed 
over the projection horizon). In a similar vein, Kempa (2010) finds a total cost of pre-funding 
of about 75 percent of GDP for 2011-60. These cost estimates constitute an upper boun
they assume full debt financing going forward and abstract from potentially beneficial effects 
of the prefunding on labor markets and growth.   
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16.      These costs are much larger 
than anticipated by the authorities at 
the time of the implementation of the 
pension reform in Poland. Projections 
done at that time of the reform showed 
a relatively small and transitory deficit 
in the state-managed pillar I system of 
0-1 percent of GDP between 1999 and 
2012, turning into a surplus thereafter. 
This gap was expected to be covered by 
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using privatization revenues and, if needed, other fiscal measures that would be required to 
maintain the general government deficit below the Maastricht limit of 3 percent of GDP. 
 an 
ion 
oland 
 capital markets, and can be 
thought of as a partial equilibrium analysis focusing solely on the pension system (official 
tions 
 
al accounts  are assumed to grow at the growth rate of the tax base and indexed at the 
inflation rate once retirement age is reached; individuals are assumed to enter the system at 
age 20, retire at age 65, and die at age 80; official ZUS projections are used for the rate of 
growth of nominal wages, inflation, and the growth rate of the contributor base; the age 
structure of contributors under pillar II is taken from reports by KNF.  
These projections were based on optimistic macroeconomic assumptions and somewhat 
lower enrollment in the 2nd pillar compared to the actual outcome. Moreover, long-run 
projections assumed an increase in labor force participation of some 20 percent and
average long-run real growth rate of 3.5 percent, despite a significant aging of the populat
by 2060.6 In contrast, long-run growth estimated by the European Commission (2009 
Sustainability Report) is projected to gradually fall to 0.5 percent by 2060. 
Box 2: Estimating the Future Fiscal Costs of Pre-Funding Pension Liabilities in P
Estimating the future cost of prefunding pension liabilities in Poland requires conducting a 
counterfactual thought experiment whereby prefunding is stopped starting with 2011. This 
experiment abstracts from any macroeconomic effects on labor and
baseline ZUS projections on the pillar I pension system are used). Under this scenario: 
• Contribution revenues would rise immediately and permanently by an amount 
proportional to the ratio of the contribution rates in the two systems. Official ZUS 
projections (baseline scenario) for the number of contributors and amount of contribu
are used.  The contribution rate is 12.2 percent to pillar I and 7.3 percent to pillar II.  
• Benefit payments would rise later, once the oldest cohorts that are now covered by the 
pillar II system reach the legal retirement age (currently 65 for men and 60 for women in
Poland). Estimating the extra benefit payments depends on a number of assumptions: 
notion
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6 See Chlon et. al. (1999), and Gura and Rutkowski (2000), Hausner (2000), Szekeli (2006).  
 
12 
 
IV. TENSIONS BETWEEN REFORMS AND SGP RULES, AND POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD 
17.      Pre-funding costs will make it more difficult for pension reformers to co
with existing SGP rules. As shown in the previous section, pre-funding future liabilities 
financed through debt issuance has a significant cost that is expected to add to the deficit fo
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have pre-funded their future 
pension liabilities and hence bear 
an additional fiscal cost, will find 
it increasingly hard to comply 
with the Maastricht limits. This is 
in contrast with countries that 
have not pre-funded pension 
liabilities, whose deficit and/or 
explicit debt are currently 
manageable, though projected to 
deteriorate significantly on 
current policies in the long run, as 
a result of aging pressures.  
18.      This problem was recognized in the early 2000s, when a temporary attempt was 
made to reconcile pension reforms and SGP rules. An early literature pointed to tensions 
between pension pre-funding and SGP rules, noting that the SGP fiscal limits stand in the 
way of welfare-improving shifts to private prefund
mply 
r 
decades. With public finances already weakened as a result of the global crisis, countries that 
ing (Tabellini, 2002, Razin and Sadka, 
2002, Jaeger, 2003). At that time, the European Commission allowed countries that 
implemented second-pillar pension reforms to adapt their fiscal policies to national 
accounting rules on a sliding scale for the first five years after the reforms. This implied a 
gradual recognition of reform costs over time, with full exclusion of costs from deficits and 
debt in the first year, and full inclusion in the 5th year. Moreover, flexibility was allowed in 
defining MTOs to take into account country-specific circumstances, including differences in 
aging costs are a result of pension reforms.  
19.      But past temporary fixes were not sufficient: SGP rules still don’t provide a 
level-playing field between reformers and non-reformers. The Maastricht limits for debt 
and deficits continue to be applied uniformly. As such, they do not adequately reflect the 
prolonged costs of reform, which, as shown earlier, last for decades rather than just a few 
years, effectively creating a 
 take into account long-run aging costs, they are not 
mportantly, are not binding.  
ies have recently petitioned the EC for a more 
ly a temporary resolution appears to be in sight. 
tries and Sweden signed a petition requesting a full 
 for the impact of pension reforms. This solution was 
nd to result in a level playing field between reformers 
ecember 2010 conclusion, the European Council 
lexibility when assessing the case for an EDP 
non-level playing field between reformers and non-reformers. 
Moreover, while MTOs are allowed to
fully aligned with such costs and, more i
20.      As a result, CEE reform countr
permanent solution, though again, on
In mid-2010, eight CEE reforming coun
adjustment of the SGP limits to account
thought to be fairly easy to implement a
and non-reformers. In response, in its D
indicated its willingness to allow for limited f
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for reforming countries under strengthened SGP rules. In particular, if the deficit is 
sufficiently close to the 3 percent-of-GDP limit, and debt is below 60 percent of GDP, a 
special allowance would be granted for the impact of pension reform on EDP deficits for
period of 5 years, such that, if the deficit after subtracting the cost of reform does not exc
the reference value, an EDP would not be initiated. The same allowance would also app
the debt for a 5-year period. Finally, to discourage opportunistic reversals of reforms, the 
same linear degressive scale would be used in reverse in case of reform reversals. This
solution is similar to the previous temporary attempt to address this issue, an
 a 
eed 
ly to 
d unlikely to 
permanently resolve the tension between the SGP rules and costs of pre-funding pensions.      
21.      In this context, CEE countries have stopped or reduced contributions to their 
 
ns 
, and 
in conjunction with significant fiscal consolidation. Some of these countries have indicated 
er 
extr the 
pill
asse d 
to others), in an effort to increase its fiscal space and in conjunction with other expansionary 
con
fisc
agr
 
pillar II pension systems in an effort to reign in fiscal deficits. So far, six New Member 
States decided to reduce pre-funding by diverting pension contributions from their private to
the public pension system to help bridge the shortfall in their fiscal revenues. Among these 
were Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, and Estonia, which temporarily lowered their contributio
to their private pillar pension systems in 2008-09 mainly in response to sharp recessions
that pillar II systems will be compensated for the temporary loss of resources. At the oth
eme, at end-2010 and well into the recovery, Hungary diverted all contributions to 
ar I pension system providing strong incentives for pensioners to also move their pension 
ts to the public system (lest they would be taxed at a significantly higher rate compare
fiscal measures. More recently, Poland followed suit with a permanent reduction in 
tributions to its private pension system starting in May 2011, aiming to help lower its 
al deficit—which rose to 8 percent of GDP at end-2010—toward the Maastricht limit 
eed with European partners. 
Hungary Diverted all contributions to pillar I and made pillar II system voluntary. 
Provided incentives for contributors to switch accumulated as
Recent Measures Affecting the Private Pillar II Pension System
sets to the 
first pillar.
Poland Reduced contributions from 7.3 to to 2.3 percent of wages starting in Amy 
2011, to be gradually raised to 3.5 percent by 2017.
Latvia
Reduced contribution rates from 10 to 2 percent of wages temporarily. 
Bulgaria
Frozen contribution rate for the II pension pillar at 5 percent for the period 
2007‐2014. In 2017, an increase to 7 percent is planned.
Estonia Suspended contribution rates (6.5 percent) temporarily. 
Lithuania Reduced contribution rates from 5.5 to 3 percent temporarily. 
Slovakia N/A
Romania Froze contribution rates to pillar II at 2 percent.
Source: IMF Reports and National Authorities.  
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22
contributions to the private pillar, combined with significant fiscal consolidation, have 
 
s that are undesirable and could have otherwise been avoided. 
y reduced incentives to undertake other reforms required to 
 as to weakened credibility in fiscal policies. Finally, if 
ly dismantled or significantly diminished, their potentially 
 market incentives, risk diversification, capital market 
owth, would be forgone.  
ld be well advised to preserve their private pension 
 with appropriate policies.8 Such private systems are by design 
elp to diversify risks and increase income support in old 
ther macroeconomic benefits, as noted earlier in the paper. 
ve to maintain them, while strengthening and 
licies that improve their efficiency and allow their long-run 
 
 
and 
uevas et. 
t ratings. In addition, such a strategy would also 
 
 
elop solutions for the 
.      If made permanent, these actions could entail risks. Temporary freezes in 
proven to be a pragmatic solution for a number of Baltic countries, which were facing deep
recessions in 2009.7  However, permanent changes could be risky, to the extent that they 
postpone needed fiscal adjustment and weaken credibility in fiscal policies. In Hungary, for 
instance, the pension “reform” created a false sense of additional fiscal space, which allowed 
the implementation of tax cut
In Poland, risks relate to potentiall
strengthen public finances, as well
pillar II systems are permanent
important benefits in terms of labor
development, and ultimately gr
 
23.      As such, countries wou
systems and support them
fiscally sustainable, expected to h
age, and potentially lead to o
Consequently, countries should stri
complementing them with po
benefits to fully materialize: 
• Pre-funding future liabilities will need to shift from full debt financing to a 
combination of fiscal consolidation measures and debt issuance, with the share of
the two depending on available fiscal space. This will be essential to contain reform
costs going forward, which will otherwise put increasing pressure on deficits 
explicit debt, even as implicit liabilities are reduced over the long run.9 As C
al (2008) document empirically, markets do not give much weight to implicit 
liabilities, and hence full debt financing of reform costs can adversely affect a 
sovereign’s perceived creditworthiness, increasing its risk premium. As such, also 
accompanying pension reform with efforts to offset its transition cost through fiscal 
adjustment would help preserve credi
help achieve inter-generational burden sharing of reform costs and facilitate an 
eventual increase in the national saving rate. But pillar II pension systems would need
to receive a sufficient share of contributions to ensure that they can deliver expected 
benefits while maintaining long-run viability. 
• Pension fund regulations and supervision need to be strengthened to ensure that 
fees and administrative costs are contained, while investments can be diversified and
life-cycle portfolios developed. Moreover, countries should dev
decumulation phase and improve risk sharing arrangements for longevity and  
                                                 
7 Orszag and Orszag (2000) note that prefunding is similar to an investment that entails some cost, while 
offering a long-run benefit. Given uncertainty surrounding estimates of pension costs and the reforms’ long-run 
benefits, flexibility in funding would be preferable.   
8 Also see Antolin and Steward (2009). 
9 Other options to offset transition costs include use of privatization receipts.  
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inflation risk (see, for example, Impavido et al, 2008). 
24.      At the same time, policies at the EU level would need to be revisited, including 
by putting more emphasis on comprehensive forward-looking fiscal indicators. 
Traditional fiscal indicators focusing on deficits and explicit debt—on which Maastricht 
limits are currently based—offer only a partial picture of public finances at a particular po
in time and do not take into account future fiscal developments. As a result, they do not 
distinguish between countries whose long-run positions have been made more sustainable 
pension reforms and others. In contrast, already existing but still largely unexploited forward-
int 
by 
looking comprehensive indicators reflect not only the effects of part and current policies on 
c 
al 
 
 
ework 
n 
ded limits that are based on sustainability concepts. On the 
downside, this may be somewhat complicated to implement in practice, as such measures are 
based on assumptions and projections of uncertain future aging costs.11 Moreover, there is a 
debate on how to treat future pension liabilities, which do not constitute legal contractual 
obligations. Still, providing information on both current and future obligations for 
policymakers, the public, and markets, would clearly help with formulating and gathering 
support for policies that have long-run benefits.12   
26.      How could such an approach be operationalized? This could be done by building 
on the existing SGP framework, but re-focusing it on countries’ Medium-Term Objectives 
(MTOs). These objectives have the advantage that they are forward looking, targeting the 
fiscal structural balance over the medium term. They are also country-specific and designed 
to take into account, to a certain extent, individual countries’ differing long-run aging costs. 
However, they are not strictly aligned with comprehensive fiscal indicators and remain non-
binding under the current framework (text chart). Hence, in a first step, MTOs should be 
more closely aligned with long-term aging costs, such as the “LTC” component of the S1 and 
                                                
countries’ current fiscal positions, but also the implications of such policies for future publi
finances. Such future considerations can be important, especially in the context of large fisc
costs associated with expected population aging. Examples of forward-looking indicators 
include the EC’s S1 and S2 sustainability indicators, which quantify the required permanent
fiscal adjustment needed to restore fiscal sustainability, and the measures of intertemporal net 
worth developed at the Fund, which measure the sustainability gaps faced by countries under 
unchanged policies.10   
25.      Use of long-run fiscal indicators would enhance transparency, strengthen SGP
rules, and improve policy-making decisions. The proposal to adjust deficits and debt to 
account for reform costs for EDP purposes further limits fiscal transparency by excluding 
certain elements from already myopic fiscal measures, thus weakening fiscal standards. In 
contrast, using comprehensive forward-looking fiscal indicators within the SGP fram
enhances fiscal transparency by providing additional information on future implicit pensio
liabilities. Moreover, this approach would also strengthen the framework by adding a 
dimension of theoretically-groun
 
10 See European Commission (2009) and Velculescu (2010).  
11 Also see Franco et. al. (2005). 
12 Perhaps a reason why Cuevas et. al (2008) did not find evidence that implicit liabilities affect sovereig it 
ratings is precisely because such forward-looking fiscal indicators that include implicit liabilities have not been 
widely published and discussed.   
n cred
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S2 indicators, which, under a finite 
horizon, currently ranges between -1 
percent of GDP (Poland) and close to 
8 percent of GDP (for Greece and 
Luxembourg).13 Second, the 
Maastricht deficit (and debt) limits 
could still be maintained as triggers for 
entry into and exit from the EDP. But 
once in the EDP, countries would need 
to prepare five-year ahead fiscal plans 
aiming to attain their strengthened 
MTOs. This will help to level the 
playing field between reformers and non-reformers, as medium-term adjustment needs will 
ed 
V.  CONCLUSIONS  
27.      
second
respons
introdu
system
eight re n 
contrib
their fis
signific
elimina
latter, P
system
mandat
individuals to transfer th blic system while cutting taxes.  
 
pension
future p
pay-as- orms, 
and in the absence of offsetting fiscal consolidation measures, overall deficits rose—to the 
reflect differing long-run requirements. The speed of adjustment would need to be agre
with EU partners based on cyclical conditions and debt dynamics. Adjustment progress 
would continue to be reviewed yearly, and fiscal projections and adjustment needs would 
also need to be updated on a yearly basis to take into account new information.  
 
Several CEE countries have been backtracking on the funding of their private 
 pillar pension systems in an effort to curtail fiscal deficits. In the early 2000s, in 
e to expected aging pressures, eight CEE countries reformed their pension systems by 
cing a private pre-funded pension pillar as a complement to their public pension 
. But, as public finances deteriorated during the recent economic downturn, six of the 
forming countries decided to reduce or suspend pre-funding by diverting pensio
utions from their private to the public pension system to help bridge the shortfall in 
cal revenues. Some countries did so early during the crisis and in conjunction with 
ant fiscal consolidation. Others, however, have sought to permanently reduce or 
te contributions to the private pension system well into the recovery. Among the 
oland implemented a permanent reduction in contributions to the private pension 
 as a complement to its fiscal consolidation plan. Hungary, however, eliminated 
ory contributions to the private system, as well as introduced incentives for 
eir private pension assets into the pu
28.     These actions are in part a response to the large fiscal costs of prefunding 
 liabilities. The introduction of a private pillar II pension system that pre-funded 
ension liabilities using part of total pension contributions led to a deficit in the public 
you go first pillar, which was financed by debt issuance. As a result of these ref
tune of an additional 1.5-2 percent of GDP per year in Poland—leading to significant 
                                                 
13 These estimates are as of 2009 and do not include pension measures undertaken since then, such as the 
. pension reforms recently taken in Greece
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increas d). With public finances 
already weakened due to the economic downturn, reform costs are now perceived as an 
dd to 
heir 
h benefits expected to take decades to materialize), the relatively 
limited size of the pillar II (which limits incentives for greater labor force participation), and 
 
s. 
e 
ng deep 
ility in fiscal policies. In Hungary, for 
instance, the recent pension “un-reform” created a false sense of additional fiscal space, 
 
s 
support in old age, they need to be strengthened and supported with appropriate policies. 
rom full debt financing to a combination  
ures and debt issuance, with the share of the two depending on 
e a sufficient share of contributions to ensure that they 
es in public debt (of about 15 percent of GDP for Polan
unduly high burden to bear, given that debt and deficit limits are approaching, and in some 
cases exceeding, Maastricht limits. Furthermore, such costs are likely to continue to a
deficits and public debt for decades, making it harder for countries that have pre-funded t
future pension liabilities to stay within the limits agreed with EU partners relative to 
countries that have not pre-funded pension liabilities. In effect, the current SGP framework is 
seen as “punishing” reformers relative to non-reformers, and potential financial sanctions 
now under consideration at the EU level will only exacerbate this problem for euro-area 
countries.  
29.      At the same time, countries have not yet fully experienced the benefits of 
introducing private pre-funded pension systems. When pension reforms were first 
introduced, countries expected significant benefits in terms of increased labor participation, 
higher saving rates, and faster capital market development. However, these anticipated 
improvements have not yet fully materialized. In part, this outcome reflects a still recent 
reform track record (wit
the choice to finance resulting gaps by debt issuance (which largely offset the rise in private
savings). This suggests that more time will be needed to assess the full impact of the reform
Indeed, the literature focusing on individual case studies such as Chile—where reforms hav
lasted longer and have been implemented more extensively and in conjunction with other 
supporting policies—demonstrates that private pension systems can have significant and 
positive benefits, albeit several years after implementation and in conjunction with fiscal 
adjustment.  
30.      While temporary changes to pre-funding of pension liabilities may be justified 
on crisis-related grounds, permanent actions entail risks. Temporary freezes in 
contributions to the private pillar, combined with significant fiscal consolidation, have 
proven to be a pragmatic solution for a number of Baltic countries, which were faci
recessions in 2009. However, permanent changes could be risky, to the extent that they 
postpone needed fiscal adjustment and affect credib
which allowed the implementation of tax cuts that could have otherwise been avoided. In 
Poland, risks relate to reduced incentives to undertake other reforms required to strengthen 
public finances, as illustrated by the decision to postpone limiting uniformed personnel and
disability benefits, two important long-run measures. 
31.      Consequently, CEE countries would be better served by preserving their private 
pension systems while aiming to enhance their benefits. Given that such private system
are by design fiscally sustainable and expected to help to diversify risks and increase income 
First, prefunding future liabilities will need to shift f
of fiscal consolidation meas
available fiscal space. This will contain reform costs going forward, help achieve inter-
generational burden sharing, and facilitate an increase in the national saving rate. But pillar II 
pension systems would need to receiv
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aintaining long-run viability. Third, pension fund 
 revisited in a number of countries, to ensure that fees 
 while investments can be diversified and life-cycle 
es need to be revisited to ensure a level playing field. 
national and international frameworks, including at 
ra
 a partial picture of public finances at a particular 
nt the implications of current policies for future 
 not distinguish between countries whose long-run 
sion reforms, and others. Solutions that focus on 
y 
 
ng-run 
forward-looking indicators that reflect aging costs.  
 
 
can deliver expected benefits while m
regulations and supervision need to be
and administrative costs are contained,
portfolios developed. 
 
32.         At the same time, EU rul
Policy-making decisions under existing 
the EU level, continue to be based on t
becoming inadequate, as they offer only
point in time and do not take into accou
public finances. As a result, they do
positions are sustainable due to pen
temporarily adjusting these indicators to exclude pension reform costs for EDP purposes onl
serve to further lower fiscal standards. Instead, a more appropriate solution would be to aim
to increase transparency, while maintaining fiscal standards that are grounded in fiscal 
sustainability concepts. This could be achieved by building on the country-specific MTOs 
already defined under the SGP framework and linking them more directly with lo
ditional indicators of deficit and debt. These are 
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